




Myanmar’s Pop Music Industry In Transition 
In the wake of the November 2010 elections, one important signal of the Myanmar 
government’s commitment to change was the cessation of the censorship of music recordings in 
October 2012.​1​  Prior to that date, the country’s Press Scrutiny Board conducted rather rigorous 
censoring of so-called stereo series (albums), in cassette and later in compact disc formats.  Producers 
wishing to sell their series in retail shops were required to submit a copy of the recording and ten copies 
of the song lyrics to the censors at the Press Security Board (MacLachlan 2011:148).  Although the 
censoring was supposed to be provided for free, as a government service to recording artists, producers 
in fact incurred regular and sometimes large costs in the form of “fees” and “fines” (MacLachlan 2011: 
149).   Ending the censorship requirement, then, represented the lifting of a financial burden borne by 
musicians and producers.  Even more importantly, it was a powerful symbol of the transition 
government’s commitment to freedom of artistic expression.  
I began conducting fieldwork in Myanmar in 2007, researching the country’s popular music 
industry.  I subsequently published a book (​REDACTED​) which describes the norms that prevailed in the 
music industry during the era of military dictatorship.  In one section of that book I examined how 
musicians and censors interacted, contesting the assertion found in other scholarly accounts that, at 
that time, censorship of music was total and that the military government controlled all artistic 
expression in Myanmar.  In fact, musicians and censors engaged in a complex negotiation of power and 
musicians exercised a considerable degree of agency in the creation and dissemination of their 
recordings.  Nevertheless, I acknowledged that censorship was an important, although not defining, 
1 ​In October 2012 the Myanmar government announced that it would no longer censor audio recordings. 
However, at the time of the writing of this chapter in 2016, the government continued to censor video 
recordings such as films and music videos. 
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element of professional pop musicians’ lives under military rule.  In retrospect, I characterize that 
research as an analysis of the pre-transition popular music scene.  This chapter constitutes the next step 
in a now decade-long inquiry into the Burmese popular music industry, and describes the situation 
during the current transition period.  My findings are based on fieldwork conducted in Yangon, the 
center of the popular music industry, in May and June 2013.  
I begin this chapter with a review of the scholarly literature on music scenes during and after 
political transitions.  Next, I report on how Myanmar’s popular music scene developed in the immediate 
wake of the cancellation of censorship.  I argue that the Burmese popular music scene is being 
significantly impacted by the democratic transition, and that just months after the censorship of 
recordings ceased, the scene was already marked by important changes.  I describe four important 
changes which were evident less than one year after government censorship ended:  the involvement of 
Anglo foreigners, the democratization of the Myanmar Musicians Association, an increased range of 
artistic expression, and a shift in how musicians earned (or anticipated earning) income.  This chapter 
concludes by speculating about possible further changes in the Burmese popular music scene. 
Contextualizing the Myanmar case:  literature on music scenes in transition  
A review of the English-language literature on political transitions during the twentieth century 
reveals varied outcomes for popular music and musicians subsequent to national political transitions of 
various kinds.  Together, the books and articles cited below suggest two conclusions:  First, 
understanding national context – including especially the historical forces that led to the transitional 
events – is crucial to understanding subsequent changes in the music scene(s) in that nation.  Second, 
the fates of musical genres are often tied to national political changes. 
Outcomes for music industries and particular genres of music vary widely, because the national 
contexts in which musics originate, and then confront change, are so widely different.  For example, 
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Wai-Chung Ho (2000) describes a sharp increase in the number of popular songs sung in Putonghua 
(Mandarin Chinese) in Hong Kong since 1997, when Hong Kong was officially handed over to the 
People’s Republic of China.  Ho explains that Hong Kong pop musicians sing in Putonghua in order to 
promote the idea of a now-unified Chinese community, existing both on the mainland and in Hong Kong. 
Further, these Hong Kong musicians increasingly engage in self-censorship – avoiding lyrics that mention 
freedom and democracy – in a “deliberate and calculated act to avoid offending China” (Ho, 2000, pp. 
348-349).  In another example, Donna Buchanan analyzes the lives of Bulgarian folk musicians who 
belonged to government-funded national folk song and dance ensembles during the Communist era. 
After the transition to parliamentary democracy in Bulgaria in 1989, Buchanan found that these 
musicians faced “a more stressful existence in which they and their art have become steadily dislocated 
from and devalued within the public mainstream” (2006, p. 7, also p. 460), in no small part because the 
new democratic government dramatically decreased its funding of folk music ensembles (p. 459). 
Other studies of post-Soviet contexts – which have been of special interest to scholars 
interested in the links between music-making and political transitions – show that in the immediate 
aftermath of the collapse of Communism, national governments and fan bases had a conflicted 
relationship with Western popular music.  Shortly after Vaclev Havel assumed power in Czechoslovakia, 
he sponsored concerts in Prague by the Rolling Stones and Lou Reed, for which local fans of rock music 
were deeply grateful (Mitchell, 1992, p. 191).  Recordings of Western rock and rap became available in 
Czechoslovakia in 1990, albeit priced very expensively.  Similarly, “Polish rock….was almost completely 
replaced in the media by Western products” due to “large local demand” (Pekacz, 1992, pp. 206-207). 
However, during this same period post-Soviet democratic governments failed to clamp down on piracy, 
that is, the illegal copying and selling of recordings (Buchanan, 2006, p. 453).  Jolanta Pekacz explains 
that “Piracy became possible thanks to a chaotic situation…in which both moral and legal distinctions 
between ‘entrepreneurship’ and crime [became] hazy” (1992, p. 207).  Ultimately, Western pop 
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super-groups including U2 and Dire Straits refused to perform in Poland due to their concerns about 
unrestrained piracy. 
Scholars have shown particular interest in the question of whether popular music-making is a 
factor in aiding political transitions, specifically, whether popular music itself can be credited for 
promoting democracy.  Their varied answers to this question underline, once again, the importance of 
accounting for specific contexts in analyzing specific outcomes.  Ingrid Byerly (1998) argues that popular 
musicians used a number strategies, including collaborations between musicians of different racial 
heritages, to effectively contest the ideology of the apartheid regime in South Africa, ultimately 
“prophesying” the downfall of the National Party government.  Jeremy Wallach asserts that 
underground rock music in Indonesia – which both expressed and modeled dissent - became “the 
soundtrack for an activist youth movement that helped topple an entrenched thirty-two year military 
dictatorship and start Indonesia on a successful road to democracy” (2005, p. 17).  By contrast, Francis 
Nyamnjoh and Jude Fokwang found that lyrics from most of the popular songs created in Cameroon 
during the repressive rule of President Ahmadou Ahidjo - from 1960 to 1982 - expressed 
“pro-establishment” messages and that “lyrics openly critical of politicians or politics were rare” (2005, 
p. 264).  “Critical songs” and “questioning songs,” which have since become an important part of the 
repertoire of Cameroonian popular music, emerged only after Ahidjo was removed from power (2005, p. 
266).  Craig Lockard found that in Thailand, “overtly political [popular] music” was created in Thailand 
after massive student demonstrations in 1973 which led to “the installation of a democratic system” 
(1996, p. 172).  However, popular songs with critical lyrics were repressed when military rule was 
reestablished, leading Lockard to write that “Political music has frequently flourished in Thailand, as long 
as conditions permit, but it is hard to judge how much actual influence it has enjoyed….Certainly it was 
not powerful enough to help prevent the triumph of right wing forces in 1976” (1996, p. 175). 
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In some cases, we observe that the relative popularity of a musical genre, and/or the 
extra-musical ideas with which the genre is associated, is directly linked to changes in the surrounding 
political context.  For example, an Indonesian popular music genre called kroncong, which centers on 
two ukulele-like instruments called ​cak​ and ​cuk​, was widely appreciated during the Indonesian 
Revolution of 1945-1949, when the Indonesians successfully fought for independence from the Dutch. 
During this era “kroncong was transformed from a despised lower class popular music to a nationalist 
emblem” (Lockard, 1996, p. 160).  During the latter half of the twentieth century, however, kroncong 
declined in popularity, as successive generations of young people connected the music with an earlier 
generation.  In Cameroon, two popular music genres emerged during the 1940s: makossa, which is 
associated with the Sawa ethnic group, and bikutsi, associated with the Beti ethnic group (Nyamnjoh 
and Fokwang, 2005, p. 254).  During the Ahidjo era (discussed above), makossa flourished.  However 
after 1982, when a Beti president assumed power, the national government chose to promote bikutski, 
showing a “noted insensitivity…towards the music of other ethnic areas in Cameroon” (p. 259). 
Makossa then became the genre of opposition protest.  
In post-Soviet Czechoslovakia, Czech folk singers who had been banned by the Communist 
government were allowed to return to the country and sing freely, and punk music became an officially 
accepted musical genre (Mitchell, 1992, pp. 192 and 200).  In other post-Soviet countries, the 
nationalism of the 1990s gave rise to a renewed emphasis on national sounds and symbols in popular 
music.  In the Ukraine, for example, popular music bands began underlining their commitment to their 
Ukrainian identity and simultaneously symbolically distancing themselves from Russia.  They 
transformed their genre by singing in Ukrainian, using traditional musical forms from Ukrainian folk 
music, and by showing images associated with Ukrainian tradition in their music videos (such as 
well-known landmarks, rural settings, clothing, food, and musical instruments) (Wickstrom, 2008, pp. 
66-73).  In Hungary, an entirely new genre emerged in the 1990s.  “National rock” or “patriotic rock” 
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differs from mainstream rock in that it is openly wedded to the Rock Against Communism ideology 
(Kürti, 2012).  The lyrics of the songs in this genre celebrate freedom from communism and evoke a 
mythic past during which Hungary was a unified and mono-ethnic Christian country.  The most extreme 
examples of such lyrics, sung by “hard-core” nationalist punk and death metal bands, espouse 
Hungarism (Hungary for the Hungarians), Nazism, racism, homophobia, and hatred of Jews and Roma 
(Kürti, 2012, p. 113).  
In what follows, I describe Myanmar’s popular music during the transition period. Following the 
scholarship cited above, and the other chapters in this volume, I seek to pay particular attention to the 
national context in which these changes occurred.  Importantly, I acknowledge the reality implicit in the 
case studies described above (and explicitly stated in Buchanan, 2006, p. 25), which is that a political 
transition is not usually a single event, but rather a process lasting years or even decades.  Therefore I 
emphasize again that my statements about the Myanmar popular music scene are temporally-bound, 
referring to a time rather early in the transition process.  More research will surely be needed, and I 
anticipate that further changes, linked in various ways to the evolving political climate, will occur.​2  
Increasing involvement of foreigners in the Myanmar popular music scene 
One change I noticed immediately when I returned to Yangon in 2013 was that Anglo foreigners 
(meaning, citizens of English-speaking countries) were becoming increasingly involved in the Burmese 
pop music industry.  Just a few years earlier, there had been no foreign nationals working in the Yangon 
music scene in any capacity, and so the presence of Anglo foreigners in a previously mono-national 
industry was striking.  All of the foreigners I met had moved to Myanmar recently without the intention 
of devoting themselves to popular music; that is, they came to work in other industries but, after 
becoming fans of and developing sympathies with local musicians, became their advocates.  Their 
2 ​Here I am mindful of László Kürti who bravely and humbly revised his earlier conclusions about 
Hungarian popular music when he analyzed the scene “twenty years after” (2012, p. 127). 
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presence in Yangon was linked to the newly-democratic government’s efforts to end the country’s 
isolation and allow foreign immigration.  
The group of Anglo foreigners who were involved in Burmese popular music was, in 2013, quite 
small – only a handful – but they had a disproportionate effect on the industry.  The best known 
example of this phenomenon is an Australian dance coach named Nikki May who moved to Yangon in 
2009.  She quickly became involved with a recently-formed girls group, then known as the Tiger Girls. 
Under Ms. May’s leadership, this group changed their name to the MeNMa Girls and achieved an 
impressive amount of international success.  The MeNMa Girls became the subject of documentary film 
(​Miss Nikki and the Tiger Girls​), performed for Hilary Clinton at a UN summit, and in 2014 moved 
temporarily to Los Angeles, having received a recording contract from a US-based record label.  
In Myanmar however – as the group members admitted to me – the MeNMa Girls did not have 
much of a following.  Notably, the group had few links with local industry power brokers.  Among the 
twenty-seven industry members I interviewed in 2013, only one said that he had ever worked with the 
MeNMa Girls; the general consensus was that this group was not well known and “not very talented” 
(e.g. G Latt, personal communication, May 23, 2013).  
The Girls’ relationships with Burmese pop musicians may have been weak because during a 
number of media interviews they had stated their commitment to “original music,” and disparaged the 
copy thachin​ tradition of their country.  To explain:  During the roughly fifty years that Burmese 
musicians have been creating popular music in the international pop-rock style, song composers utilized 
two composition techniques, both of which are appreciated by Burmese fans and professional 
colleagues.  The first of these techniques, and the only one widely understood in Western countries, 
involves using all new sonic elements to construct a song: a new melody accompanied by new 
harmonies and sung using new words.  Such a song is called an ​own tune​.  When using the second 
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technique, Burmese song composers copy varying amounts of a melody, harmony and accompanying 
timbres from a previously-existing song, almost always a hit song originating in the United States or the 
United Kingdom.  In such a song, called ​copy thachin​, the only completely new element is the 
Burmese-language words, which are not a translation of the original English words.  Both ​own tunes​ and 
copy thachin​ are widely performed by professional pop musicians in Myanmar, although ​copy thachin 
are frequently derided by outsiders as nothing more than plagiarism (MacLachlan, 2016).  
The MeNMa Girls’ articulation of their position on ​copy thachin​ – indeed, the very position that 
has earned them admiring press reports in venues like the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the 
Singapore Times and Newsweek Magazine – may be attributed in part to the influence of their Anglo 
manager, Ms. May.  After all – as group members acknowledged to me - when they were the Tiger Girls, 
the group performed ​copy thachin​ (personal communication, June 3, 2013).  The Anglo foreigners who 
became involved in Burmese popular music in the early years of the political transition shared the 
conviction, widespread in English-language majority countries, that “originality” is the ​sine qua non​ of 
artistic endeavors.  Their influence was evident in other cases. 
The punk band Side Effect, for example, had a Canadian manager named Daniel Gelfer.  Due to 
Gelfer’s connections with the Anglo ex-patriate community in Yangon, Side Effect gained an important 
following among foreigners.  I attended a Side Effect concert at a restaurant in Yangon in May 2013, and 
was fascinated to be part of an audience that included more Anglos than Burmese.  Side Effect toured 
Germany in 2014, and their lead singer claimed that they have more fans in Europe than they do in 
Myanmar (Roberts, 2014).  Darko C, the lead singer, told me that he “hates” ​copy thachin​, although Side 
Effect has covered an English-language song. Darko insisted that covering a song is different than 
copying it, because covering is a way of paying tribute to a song one loves (Darko C, personal 
communication, May 15, 2013). 
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Both the MeNMa Girls and Side Effect performed at Yangon’s 50​th​ Street Café and Bar, an 
important concert venue in the heart of Myanmar’s largest city.  In 2013 the manager of the bar was Phil 
Blackwood, a New Zealander who, like Nikki May and Daniel Gelfer, had a strongly negative view of ​copy 
thachin.​  ​Blackwood was committed to booking local live bands to perform in the bar, and this 
represented a great opportunity for local musicians, since there are very few small venues in Yangon 
where up-and-coming performers can present concerts for well-heeled audiences of locals and 
foreigners.  However, as Blackwood told me gently, he did not plan to ever book a group which performs 
copy thachin​ – meaning that, like the other influential Anglos entering the Burmese pop music scene, he 
would promote artists who share his own value system (personal communication, June 12, 2013).  Since 
this value system differs sharply from the value system common across the Burmese popular music 
industry, and especially from that of the ​copy thachin​-performing singers who are very popular with 
Burmese fans, foreigner influence may have a rather distorting effect on the scene.​3​  In the near future, 
Burmese musicians who gain international followings may be, ironically, musicians who have relatively 
little support at home. 
The Myanmar Musicians Association and the advent of the royalty payment system 
The Myanmar Musicians Association, or the ​Myanmar Gita Asiayon​, is an umbrella group which 
aims to represent the interests of recording artists in Myanmar.  I wrote at length about the work of the 
MMA, and musicians’ responses to it, in ​(REDACTED)​.  Pre-transition, the members of the MMA were 
appointed by the military government, and therefore the organization was distrusted and dismissed by 
most musicians, although MMA board members whom I met insisted they were pursuing initiatives 
which would redound to the benefit of musicians.  In September 2012, the MMA had its first-ever fully 
3 ​Note, however, that the three Anglo individuals described in this section will presumably have little 
influence going forward.  By 2016, both Nikki May and Daniel Gelfer had left Myanmar in pursuit of 




democratic election, meaning that members were able to vote freely for a board of leaders who make 
decisions that affect musicians’ livelihoods.  In 2013 the elected General Secretary was Phyu Phyu Kyaw 
Thein, a highly successful singer who described the MMA’s evolution by saying that the group had 
become “a real NGO” (personal communication, May 18, 2013).​  ​One of the first changes the MMA 
made was to post the minutes of their monthly meetings on Facebook, in an effort to show their 
commitment to transparent and democratic government.  
Musicians I interviewed in 2013 were generally happy about this development, although they 
were sanguine about the new leadership, pointing out that, while the new leaders meant well, they 
were inexperienced (e.g. Min Oo, personal communication, May 29, 2013).  For their part, the elected 
leaders seemed sincerely committed to protecting the interests of their members.  However, the MMA 
and its members dealt with a number of controversial issues, and during interviews with me, dissent was 
evident.   In 2013, early in the transition era, the MMA’s relationship with its members reflected the 
messiness of democracy, a messiness which can be disappointing to people who have idealized 
expectations about freedom and progress. 
The most controversial issue the MMA took on was the payment of royalties.  The MMA is the 
body to which radio stations and movie producers are supposed to pay royalty fees each time they 
broadcast a recording.  The MMA is then supposed to disburse these royalty fees to the artists involved 
in the creation of the recording.  As of 2009, virtually no one in the Burmese popular music industry 
used or even understood the concept of “royalties.”  When I explained this notion to musicians during 
interviews (conducted pre-transition), they were somewhat puzzled.  They told me over and over that 
“the Burmese way” was for producers – that is, the financial backers of recorded albums – to pay flat 
fees to songwriters, singers and other performers at the time they purchased their services.  Any profits 
from the sale of recordings were returned to producers.  And the only radio station in Myanmar which 
played a lot of popular music, and which welcomed caller requests for airplay, did not compensate 
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artists or producers for broadcasting their works.  The principal way in which musicians made money 
under this system was by earning flat fees working in recording studios or doing live concerts.  
Since 2010, the number of privately-owned radio stations in Myanmar has grown exponentially. 
In 2012 the newly-elected MMA board decided to aggressively pursue radio station owners for royalty 
payments.  The MMA decided to charge 750 kyat (slightly less than one US dollar by current exchange 
rates) for each broadcast of any given song.  They committed to disbursing the royalty fee as follows: 
150 kyats, or 20%, to the MMA, 150 kyats to the lead singer, 150 kyats to the songwriter, 150 kyats to 
the producer, 90 kyats to be divided among the instrument players, and 60 kyats to the recording studio 
(Phyu Phyu Kyaw Thein, personal communication, June 7, 2013).  The amounts that different industry 
members earn under this scheme is a direct reflection of their relative amounts of power in the industry. 
Lead singers, for example, often spend less time in the studio than do instrument players.  However, 
because they are literally front and center during concerts and in music videos, their faces and names 
are well-known to fans.  They are “nammeh-kyi deh,” or big names, and they can therefore command a 
larger portion of the royalty payment than, for example, guitar players who may have contributed more 
time and effort to the making of the recording.  Note that back-up singers, or “harmony” as they are 
called in Myanmar, get nothing under this scheme.  
As of 2013, the MMA had not paid out many royalty fees, for a few different reasons.  Musicians 
were still, to some degree, uneducated about royalties and therefore did not file the necessary 
paperwork in order to collect them.  (And some musicians​ ​told me that they heard the paperwork was 
so confusing that they did not even bother trying (Ah Moon, Htike Htike and Kimi, personal 
communication, June 3, 2013)).  The MMA also had difficulty extracting royalty monies from radio 
station managers, many of whom are well-known musicians in their own right, like Zaw Win Htut.  These 
musicians/managers have their own opinions about what kinds of payments are appropriate, and what 
role the MMA ought to play in the newly-emerging music economy.  And, unfortunately, the MMA hired 
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a corrupt office manager who embezzled 500 000 kyats worth of royalty payments in 2012​ ​(Myint Moe 
Aung, personal communication, May 24, 2013).  The MMA pursued this case in court, but in the 
meantime, the unpaid fees undermined the trust they asked musicians to place in the organization.  The 
challenges the MMA faced resembled those scholars have documented elsewhere; in brief, when 
small-scale music industries in developing countries create organizations to oversee royalty payments, 
these organizations are often unsuccessful at funneling the money owed to the artists (Wallis and Malm, 
1984).  
In 2013 I met a number of prominent musicians who told me that they had quit, or refused to 
join, the new MMA​ ​(e.g. Shwe Gyaw Gyaw, personal communication, May 25, 2013; G Latt, personal 
communication, May 23, 2013; Lin Lin, personal communication May 24, 2013; Ayo, personal 
communication, May 31, 2013).  These musicians wanted to manage their own careers, and they 
rejected the control (or “protection”) offered by an organization that was, for decades, a patsy of the 
military regime.  These musicians hired, or told me they planned to hire, lawyers to help them pursue 
the royalties to which they felt entitled.  They pointed out that, while lawyers do charge fees, their fees 
are generally lower than the 20% the MMA reserves for itself.  A number of these musicians stated that 
they felt the MMA’s division of royalty monies was inequitable; for example, why should a studio owner, 
who has already profited by renting out his studio to recording artists, be further compensated when 
the recording is broadcast?  Songwriters mounted a campaign to advocate for royalties each time 
singers perform songs live in concert – a campaign that failed, largely because tremendously influential 
singers like Lay Phyu refused to cooperate.  Musicians who disdained the MMA argued further that by 
dealing directly with radio station managers – who in some cases were their industry colleagues - they 
could negotiate different royalty fees for their work.  A number of them said they would like to offer 
their latest albums to radio stations for free, in hopes that the radio stations would broadcast them 
frequently and thereby build a fan following.  In other cases, they would like to charge far higher royalty 
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fees than the standard amounts set by the MMA.  They were particularly angered by the fact that the 
new and supposedly improved MMA declined to reopen a deal reached with cell phone companies, in 
which the cell phone companies pay 300 kyats for 20 years of use of a recording as a ringtone (G Latt, 
personal communication, May 23, 2013).  Given that the cellphone market was exploding in Myanmar, 
these artists pointed out that they could have negotiated for much more money.  
Artistic freedom and its discontents  
Another thorny issue that the MMA attempted to arbitrate at the very time I was interviewing 
musicians in Yangon was that of rating, or somehow otherwise commenting on, recordings.  To put this 
dispute in context:  just months after the government ceased censoring music recordings, not one 
person among the twenty-seven I interviewed in 2013 thought the country should return to the old 
system of government censorship.  Musicians were uniformly relieved that they no longer had to endure 
the inconvenience of submitting their recordings for approval, and that they no longer had to pay bribes 
to the staff members at the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division.  Also, musicians were generally very 
glad that in the newly-free market they were now able to produce “political songs.”  In truth, few of 
these “political songs” were available as of May 2013, but a number of my interlocutors pointed me to a 
recording produced by the National League for Democracy (Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party).  The CD 
was titled “Freedom Songs;” this very title would have been disallowed by censors pre-transition. 
However, in 2013 I found it for sale in the very first retail shop I entered, where a clerk sold it to me 
without any noticeable reaction.  In less than one year, then, forbidden music had become 
commonplace.  However, some recording artists were still cautious, pointing out that the federal 
government had promised a democratic government for decades, and had even allowed a general 
freedom of expression for short periods – only to later punish opponents of the regime.  These 
musicians said that, whatever progressive agenda the government was now proclaiming, they were 
unwilling to record songs which expressed open and targeted dissent.  “I’m pretty sure you can’t sing, 
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“Fuck you, Mr. President,” even now,” said Darko C (personal communication, May 15, 2013).  As film 
director Ko Myint pointed out:  “They can put you in jail ​any​ time” (personal communication, May 21, 
2013).  
Although most of the musicians I talked with were openly glad about the new freedoms they 
enjoyed in 2013, they evinced a range of opinions about how that freedom should be deployed. The 
leaders of the MMA and many rank and file musicians were concerned about the influence of 
uncensored songs on the general public.  A number of my informants used the English phrases “rude 
words” or “bad words” to describe lyrics that could now be written, and that they had heard in recent 
recordings.   These “bad words” generally fell into two categories:  First, lyrics – or visual representations 
in music videos – that refer to sexual acts.  One example mentioned to me in multiple interviews was a 
hit song called “In Love With You,” recorded by a young singer called Eain Eain.  Although the words in 
this song are innocuous, the accompanying video shows a young couple cuddling on a bed, with 
repeated references to more sexually suggestive visuals (for example, the woman licks her lips and lifts 
her skirt, and eventually they engage in a very close embrace while beginning to remove each other’s 
clothes).​4​  It is important to point out here that musicians objected to this not because they were 
reactionary conservatives or especially prudish about sex.  Rather, they feared that sexual content in 
music could lead to family breakdown.  As Nay Win Htun, a well-known music teacher, said, “We can’t 
listen to this music between mothers and sons, or between brothers and sisters” (personal 
communication, May 16, 2013).  And this is a legitimate concern:  while the government elected in 2015 
may be more democratic, it is not yet supplying a reliable social safety net to vulnerable citizens.  As 
Burmese people age, they must be able to depend on their children and other relatives to support them 
financially.  Therefore, strong relationships between parents and children are of utmost importance.  
4 ​See ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFBTPQ385tU 
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The second type of “bad words” which worried my interlocutors in 2013 are those that evoke 
racist attitudes.  Here again, my respondents were unable to identify many examples of such words, 
although they were sincerely concerned.  One song referenced in interviews (e.g. Myint Moe Aung, 
personal communication, May 24, 2013) was the “Song to Whip Up Religious Blood,” which encourages 
listeners to “buy Buddhist.”  This song was not recorded by professionals, but the recording is attractive 
enough that it is frequently played at Buddhist religious events (Marshall, 2013).  Musicians feared that 
more such songs could be recorded and that they could enflame the deadly conflict between Buddhists 
and Muslims which was then spreading around Burma, and which subsequently flared up in Malaysia.  
Although none of my informants could identify an anti-Muslim song created by industry 
professionals, I did come across a professionally-created recording that makes generalized negative 
comments about another racial group.  It is titled “The Death of Mandalay” and the composer, Lynn 
Lynn, is a well-regarded and successful member of the Burmese pop music industry.​5​  He told me that 
this is one of his “political songs” (personal communication, May 24, 2013).  In the second verse, the 
lyrics say that Mandalay is dying because it is now filled with “compassionless,” “pale-skinned 
foreigners” with “slit eyes.”  I played the Youtube video of this recording for seven well-educated 
Burmese people during a presentation at the INGO Relief International (June 5, 2013).  None of them 
seemed to find it terribly offensive, and one pointed out that “this is what people think” about Chinese 
immigrants in Burma.  I highlight it here as a clear-cut example of racist lyrics, or “bad words,” and as 
evidence that fears about songs like this coming to the fore are not overblown. 
The MMA responded to the concerns about “bad words” in now-uncensored songs.  The 
association’s position was articulated by one of their elected board members, Myint Moe Aung: “There 
has to be some rules, otherwise there will be destruction” (personal communication, May 24, 2013). 
Late in 2012, the MMA proposed a plan to rate musical recordings.  The plan was to attach a letter to 
5 ​See ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYQFb9-1gO8  
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each song on a ​series​:  A, meaning appropriate for all ages; B, meaning something like parental guidance, 
appropriate for those age 16 and over; or C, appropriate for adults only.  I asked most of my 
respondents their opinion about this plan.  Twelve of them said they supported the idea.  Interestingly, 
four of them said specifically that they supported the notion of rating songs specifically because they 
understand that recordings are rated for content in other countries.  (When I asked what they meant by 
other countries, all said the United States).  
However, I did hear some strongly dissenting voices during my interviews, which began in the 
second week of May 2013.  Several prominent musicians objected to having their music evaluated, in 
any way, by anybody – but especially by the MMA, which until recently had been controlled by the 
military government.  As they pointed out, it was entirely unclear who would decide what kinds of songs 
were appropriate for what ages, on what basis these decisions would be made, and how the ratings 
might affect airplay and therefore, royalty payments.   On May 31, 2013, the MMA announced that they 
would not pursue a rating system.  The General Secretary, Phyu Phyu Kyaw Thein, told me that the 
decision was taken because so many MMA members were “allergic” to the idea (personal 
communication, June 7, 2013).  Instead, she said, going forward the MMA intended to listen to all 
newly-recorded songs and make “comments” on songs which have “dangerous categories for the 
community.”  These dangerous categories are 1) lyrics which might promote ethnic or religious conflict 
and 2) lyrics which promote drug use, smoking or prostitution.  The MMA will forward the comments to 
radio and television broadcasters.  The program managers will then have to decide whether or not to 
broadcast these potentially dangerous songs. 
It is unclear, at this point, how efficiently the MMA will implement this policy, and also, what the 
impact will be if they do.  Musicians will have to submit their recordings to the MMA in order for them 
to be commented upon.  But, under Myanmar’s newly-democratic regime, the MMA cannot force 
musicians to submit their work.  Secondly, it is unclear whether radio station managers will pay any 
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attention to the MMA’s comments on recordings.  These managers’ priority is to play music that appeals 
to their stations’ fans, rather than to adhere to the agenda of the MMA.  
Future possibilities 
What does the future hold for Myanmar’s popular music scene and for the musicians who make 
their living in it?  As the literature review above demonstrated, musical genres and approaches to music 
making are often profoundly affected by national political changes.  In the Myanmar case, it seems 
possible that, if foreign (Anglo) influence on popular music increases, ​copy thachin​ will decrease in 
number and popularity.  If Yangon-based musicians collaborate more frequently with foreigners who 
believe that ​copy thachin​ creation is nothing more than plagiarism, they may decline to record such 
songs.  Indeed, in 2013 some of my informants claimed that writing ​own tunes – ​that is, the creation of 
original songs – was already becoming the preferred composition method​ ​among their colleagues (e.g. 
Minn Chit Thu, personal communication, May 19, 2013).  
It seems likely that the majority of Myanmar’s professional musicians will embrace the idea that 
royalties ought to be paid to them by the MMA.  Although in 2013 musicians expressed confusion about, 
and even distrust of, the MMA’s royalty payment plan, just two years later, royalties were being paid by 
the MMA.  The payment of royalties is, in effect, its own convincing argument.  A sound engineer told 
me that he was happy to receive approximately $3000.00 USD in royalty monies in 2015 (Aung Doo, 
personal communication, September 12, 2016).  For him this was a bonus, an addition to the money he 
earned in the traditional way (that is, being paid a one-time fee at the time tracks are recorded).  By 
2016, other musicians had come to understand royalties as rightfully belonging to them, and the MMA 
as responsible for disbursing those royalties.  In September of that year, composer Jet Mya Thaung held 
a press conference to announce that he planned to sue both the MMA and five FM radio stations for 
unpaid royalties (Su Myat Mon, 2016).  
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Perhaps the greatest concern for the Myanmar music industry in the future is the ongoing 
tension between the desire for freedom of expression and the perceived need for control of that 
expression.  As composer Shwe Gyaw Gyaw told me in 2013, “freedom” can be abused in a myriad of 
ways.  He saw this notion being abused by the pirates who make illegal copies of Burmese recordings 
and sell them for their own profit:  “Freedom is good, but they [fellow Burmese] think piracy is freedom. 
Government does not help to educate them.  If you tell someone, ‘Don’t [illegally] copy this disc or this 
file, they say, ‘Hey! This is democracy!’” (personal communication, May 25, 2013).  Piracy undermines 
the economic security of musicians; and the freedom to sing “bad words” can endanger society at large. 
The recent history of White Power music in the United States reminds us that music can be a powerful 
tool in the service of hatred and violence.  As both Mark Hamm (2002) and Jonathan Pieslak (2015) have 
demonstrated, sales of White Power recordings are a major source of funding for vicious racist groups, 
White Power concerts have sparked violence on numerous occasions, and the musicians in this 
movement have become attractive role models for disaffected young people.  Hamm concludes that 
“chronic and persistent exposure to [such music] provided American skinheads with the vitality, the 
emotions and the excitement necessary for committing violence against their perceived enemies“ (2002, 
p. 89).  ​When Buddhist mobs are being encouraged to destroy Muslim schools, businesses, 
mosques and even people, Burmese people rightly fear any move by musicians to make 
violence seem glamorous or cool.  At the same time, one of the greatest promises of Myanmar’s 
democratic transition and the election of 2015 was that the country’s citizens could speak, write 
and sing without being limited by government censorship.  Musicians, in particular, will continue 
to expect to see this promise fulfilled.  
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